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11.1 Introduction
In this paper I present international comparisons of economic growth
among the G7 nations—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. These comparisons focus on the
impact of investment in information technology (IT) equipment and soft-
ware over the period 1980 to 2001. In 1998, the G7 nations accounted for
nearly 60 percent of world output1 and a much larger proportion of world
investment in IT. Economic growth in the G7 has experienced a strong re-
vival since 1995, driven by a powerful surge in IT investment.
The resurgence of economic growth in the United States during the
1990s and the crucial role of IT investment has been thoroughly docu-
mented and widely discussed.2 Similar trends in the other G7 economies
have been more diﬃcult to detect, partly because of discrepancies among
oﬃcial price indexes for IT equipment and software identiﬁed by Andrew
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and Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005).Wyckoﬀ (1995).3 Paul Schreyer (2000) has constructed “internationally
harmonized” IT prices that eliminate many of these discrepancies.4
Precise measures of computer prices that hold product quality constant
were introduced into the U.S. national accounts in 1985 and the U.S. Pro-
ducer Price Index (PPI) during the 1990s. The national accounts now rely
on PPI data. Gregory Chow (1967) had pioneered the use of hedonic tech-
niques for constructing a constant product quality index of computer
prices. Hedonic techniques for modeling automobile prices were intro-
duced by Court (1939) and revived by Zvi Griliches (1961).
The measurement of IT investment reﬂects steady progress in meeting
the challenges arising from hard-to-measure goods and services, but im-
portant gaps remain. In addition to the constant quality computer prices
introduced in 1985, the U.S. national accounts incorporated constant qual-
ity prices for semiconductor products in 1996. Investment in software was
ﬁrst included in the national accounts in the eleventh comprehensive revi-
sion, released on October 27, 1999. Research is still underway on constant
quality telecommunications equipment prices and constant quality prices
for software.5
Using internationally harmonized prices for France, Germany, Italy,
and the United Kingdom, I have analyzed the role of investment and pro-
ductivity as sources of growth in the G7 countries over the period 1980–
2001. I have subdivided the period in 1989 and 1995 in order to focus on
the most recent experience. I have decomposed growth of output for each
country between growth of input and productivity. Finally, I have allocated
the growth of input between investments in tangible assets, especially IT
and software and human capital.6
Growth in IT capital input per capita jumped to double-digit levels in
the G7 nations after 1995. This can be traced to acceleration in the rate of
decline of IT prices, analyzed in my presidential address to the American
Economic Association.7 The powerful surge in investment was most pro-
nounced in Canada, but capital input growth in Japan, the United States,
and the United Kingdom was only slightly lower. France, Germany, and
Italy also experienced double-digit growth, but lagged considerably behind
the leaders.
During the 1980s, productivity played a minor role as a source of growth
for the G7 countries except Japan, where productivity accounted for 30
percent of economic growth. Productivity accounted for only 15 percent of
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7. See Jorgenson (2001).growth in the United States, 13 percent in France and the United King-
dom, and 12 percent in Germany; only 2 percent of growth in Canada was
due to productivity, while the decline of productivity retarded growth by 14
percent in Italy. Between 1989 and 1995, productivity growth declined fur-
ther in the G7 nations, except for Italy and Germany. Productivity declined
for France and the United Kingdom but remained positive for the United
States, Canada, and Japan.
Productivity growth revived in all the G7 countries after 1995, again
with the exception of Germany and Italy. The resurgence was most dra-
matic in Canada, the United Kingdom, and France, partly oﬀsetting years
of dismal productivity growth. Japan exhibited the highest growth in out-
put per capita among the G7 nations from 1980 to 1995. Japan’s level of
output per capita rose from the lowest in the G7 to the middle of the group
in 2001. Although this advance owed more to input per capita than pro-
ductivity, Japan’s productivity growth far outstripped the other members
of the G7. Nonetheless, Japan’s productivity remained the lowest among
the G7 nations.
The United States led the G7 in output per capita for the period 1989 to
2001. Canada’s edge in output per capita in 1980 had disappeared by 1989.
The United States led the G7 countries in input per capita during 1980 to
2001, but U.S. productivity languished below the levels of Canada, France,
and Italy.
In section 11.2, I outline the methodology for this study, based on my
presidential address. I have revised and updated the U.S. data presented
there through 2001. Comparable data on investment in IT have been con-
structed for Canada by Statistics Canada.8 Data on IT for France, Ger-
many, Italy, and the United Kingdom have been developed for the Euro-
pean Commission by Bart van Ark et al. (2002).9 Finally, data for Japan
have been assembled by myself and Kazuyuki Motohashi for the Research
Institute on Economy, Trade, and Industry.10 I have linked these data by
means of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s
(OECD’s) purchasing power parities for 1999.11
In section 11.3, I consider the impact of IT investment and the relative
importance of investment and productivity in accounting for economic
growth among the G7 nations. Investments in human capital and tangible
assets, especially IT equipment and software, account for the overwhelm-
ing proportion of growth. Diﬀerences in the composition of capital and la-
bor inputs are essential for identifying persistent international diﬀerences
in output and accounting for the impact of IT investment.
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OECD Web site: http://www.sourceoecd.org.In section 11.4, I consider alternative approaches to international com-
parisons. The great revival of interest in economic growth among econo-
mists dates from Maddison’s (1982) updating and extension of Simon Kuz-
nets’s (1971) long-term estimates of the growth of national product and
population for fourteen industrialized countries, including the G7 nations.
Maddison (1982, 1991) added Austria and Finland to Kuznets’ list and
presented growth rates covering periods beginning as early as 1820 and ex-
tending through 1989.
Maddison (1987, 1991) also generated growth accounts for major indus-
trialized countries, but did not make level comparisons like those presented
in section 11.2. As a consequence, productivity diﬀerences were omitted
from the canonical formulation of “growth regressions” by William Baumol
(1986). This proved to be a fatal ﬂaw in Baumol’s regression model, reme-
died by Nazrul Islam’s (1995) panel data model. Section 11.5 concludes the
paper.
11.2 Investment and Productivity
My papers with Laurits Christensen and Dianne Cummings (Chris-
tensen, Cummings, and Jorgenson 1980, 1981) developed growth accounts
for the United States and its major trading partners—Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
for 1947 to 1973. We employed gross national product (GNP) as a measure
of output and incorporated constant quality indexes of capital and labor
input for each country. Our 1981 paper compared levels of output, inputs,
and productivity for all nine nations.
I have updated the estimates for the G7—Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States—through 1995in
earlier work. The updated estimates are presented in my papers with Chrys
Dougherty (Dougherty and Jorgenson 1996, 1997) and Eric Yip (Jorgen-
son and Yip 2000). We have shown that productivity accounted for only 11
percent of economic growth in Canada and the United States over the pe-
riod 1960 to 1995.
My paper with Yip (Jorgenson and Yip 2000) attributed 47 percent of
Japanese economic growth during the period 1960–1995 to productivity
growth. The proportion attributable to productivity approximated 40 per-
cent of growth for the four European countries—France (.38), Germany
(.42), Italy (.43), and the United Kingdom (.36). Input growth predomi-
nated over productivity growth for all the G7 nations.
I have now incorporated new data on investment in IT equipment and
software for the G7. I have also employed internationally harmonized
prices like those constructed by Schreyer (2000). As a consequence, I have
been able to separate the contribution of capital input to economic growth
into IT and non-IT components. While IT investment follows similar pat-
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helps to explain important diﬀerences in growth rates among the G7.
11.2.1 Comparisons of Output, Input, and Productivity
My ﬁrst objective is to extend my estimates for the G7 nations with
Christensen, Cummings, Dougherty, and Yip to the year 2001. Following
the methodology originally proposed by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), I
have chosen gross domestic product (GDP) as a measure of output. I have
included imputations for the services of consumers’ durables as well as
land, buildings, and equipment owned by nonproﬁt institutions. I have also
distinguished between investments in IT equipment and software and in-
vestments in other forms of tangible assets.
A constant quality index of capital input is based on weights that reﬂect
diﬀerences in capital consumption, tax treatment, and the rate of decline
of asset prices. I have derived estimates of capital input and property in-
come from national accounting data. Similarly, a constant quality index of
labor input is based on weights by age, sex, educational attainment, and
employment status. I have constructed estimates of hours worked and la-
bor compensation from labor force surveys for each country.
In table 11.1, I present output per capita for the G7 nations from 1980 to
2001, taking the United States as 100.0 in 2000. Output and population are
given separately in tables 11.2 and 11.3. I use 1999 purchasing power pari-
ties from the OECD to convert output from domestic prices for each coun-
try into U.S. dollars. The United States maintained its lead among the G7
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Table 11.1 Levels of output and input per capita and total factor productivity
United United 
Year States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Output per capita
1980 63.9 67.6 45.0 45.9 49.3 45.9 43.6
1989 79.7 78.8 56.5 54.1 58.6 57.3 58.4
1995 85.6 79.6 61.4 57.0 65.0 62.1 65.4
2001 100.3 91.9 71.3 64.0 69.2 68.8 70.4
Input per capita
1980 70.5 64.2 50.2 46.5 61.0 43.1 61.9
1989 83.9 74.4 61.2 53.3 71.1 55.5 74.8
1995 88.8 75.2 67.0 57.0 73.7 58.8 78.8
2001 100.8 83.7 73.6 61.7 79.0 67.2 81.1
Total factor productivity
1980 90.6 105.4 89.5 98.6 80.8 106.6 70.4
1989 94.9 105.9 92.3 101.5 82.4 103.2 78.0
1995 96.4 105.9 91.7 99.9 88.1 105.6 83.0
2001 99.5 109.7 96.9 103.6 87.6 102.5 86.8
Notes: U.S.   100.0 in 2000. Canada data begins in 1981.countries in output per capita after 1989. Canada led the United States in
1980, but fell behind during the 1980s. The U.S.-Canada gap widened con-
siderably during the 1990s.
The four major European nations—the United Kingdom, France, Ger-
many, and Italy—had very similar levels of output per capita throughout
the period 1980–2001. Japan rose from last place in 1980 to fourth among
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Table 11.3 Growth rate and level in population (%)
United United 
Year States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Growth rate
1980–1989 0.92 1.18 0.16 0.54 0.05 0.05 0.59
1989–1995 1.23 1.22 0.24 0.45 0.62 0.18 0.33
1995–2001 1.12 0.95 0.24 0.41 0.14 0.18 0.22
Level (millions)
1980 227.7 24.8 56.3 55.1 78.3 56.4 116.8
1989 247.4 27.3 57.1 57.9 78.7 56.7 123.1
1995 266.3 29.4 58.0 59.4 81.7 57.3 125.6
2001 284.8 31.1 58.8 60.9 82.3 57.9 127.2
Level (US.   100.0 in 2000)
1980 80.7 8.8 20.0 19.5 27.8 20.0 41.4
1989 87.7 9.7 20.3 20.5 27.9 20.1 43.6
1995 94.4 10.4 20.5 21.1 28.9 20.3 44.5
2001 101.0 11.0 20.8 21.6 29.2 20.5 45.1
Note: Canada data begins in 1981.
Table 11.2 Growth rate and level of output
United United 
Year States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Growth rate (%)
1980–1989 3.38 3.10 2.69 2.38 1.99 2.51 3.83
1989–1995 2.43 1.39 1.62 1.30 2.34 1.52 2.23
1995–2001 3.76 3.34 2.74 2.34 1.18 1.90 1.45
Level (billions of 2000 U.S. dollars)
1980 5,361.2 618.4 934.0 932.0 1,421.7 955.7 1,875.9
1989 7,264.2 792.6 1,190.3 1,154.3 1,700.2 1,197.4 2,648.7
1995 8,403.3 861.4 1,311.8 1,247.8 1,956.3 1,311.5 3,017.1
2001 10,530.4 1,052.3 1,545.9 1,436.0 2,099.8 1,470.1 3,301.3
Level (U.S.   100.0 in 2000)
1980 51.6 5.9 9.0 9.0 13.7 9.2 18.0
1989 69.9 7.6 11.4 11.1 16.3 11.5 25.5
1995 80.8 8.3 12.6 12.0 18.8 12.6 29.1
2001 101.3 10.1 14.9 13.8 20.2 14.1 31.7
Note: Canada data begins in 1981.the G7 in 2001, lagging considerably behind the United States and Canada,
but only slightly behind the United Kingdom. Japan led the G7 in the
growth of output per capita from 1980 to 1995, but fell behind the United
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy after 1995.
In table 11.1, I present input per capita for the G7 over the period 1980
to 2001, taking the United States as 100.0 in 2000. I express input per
capita in U.S. dollars, using purchasing power parities constructed for this
study.12The United States was the leader among the G7 in input per capita
throughout the period. In 2001, Canada ranked next to the United States,
with Japan third and Germany fourth. France and Italy started at the bot-
tom of the ranking and remained there throughout the period.
In table 11.1, I also present productivity levels for the G7 over the period
1980 to 2001. Productivity is deﬁned as the ratio of output to input, in-
cluding both capital and labor inputs. Canada was the productivity leader
during the period 1989 to 2001, with France and Italy close behind, despite
the drop in productivity in Italy! Japan made the most substantial gains in
productivity, while there were more modest increases in the United States,
Canada, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.
I summarize growth in output and input per capita and productivity for
the G7 nations in table 11.4. I present growth rates of output and popula-
tion for the period 1980 to 2001 in tables 11.2 and 11.3. Output growth
slowed in the G7 after 1989 but revived for all nations except Japan and
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12. The purchasing power parities for outputs are based on OECD (2002). Purchasing
power parities for inputs follow the methodology described in detail by Jorgenson and Yip
(2001).
Table 11.4 Growth in output and input per capita and total factor productivity (%)
United United 
Year States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Output per capita
1980–1989 2.46 1.92 2.54 1.84 1.93 2.46 3.25
1989–1995 1.20 0.17 1.38 0.85 1.72 1.33 1.90
1995–2001 2.64 2.38 2.50 1.93 1.04 1.72 1.23
Input per capita
1980–1989 1.94 1.86 2.20 1.52 1.71 2.82 2.10
1989–1995 0.94 0.17 1.49 1.11 0.60 0.96 0.86
1995–2001 2.10 1.80 1.59 1.33 1.14 2.21 0.48
Total factor productivity
1980–1989 0.52 0.06 0.34 0.32 0.23 –0.36 1.15
1989–1995 0.26 0.00 –0.11 –0.26 1.12 0.37 1.04
1995–2001 0.54 0.58 0.91 0.60 –0.10 –0.49 0.75
Note: Canada data begins in 1981.Germany after 1995. Output per capita followed a similar pattern, with
Canada barely expanding during the period 1989 to 1995.
Japan led in growth of output per capita through 1995, but fell to the
lower echelon of the G7 after 1995. Japan led in productivity growth dur-
ing 1980 to 1989, Germany led from 1989 to 1995, and the United King-
dom led from 1995 to 2001. For all countries and all time periods, except
for Germany during the period 1989 to 1995 and Japan after 1989, the
growth of input per capita exceeded growth of productivity by a substan-
tial margin. Productivity growth in the G7 slowed during the period 1989
to 1995, except for Germany and Italy, where productivity slumped after
1995.
Italy led the G7 in growth of input per capita for the periods 1980 to 1989
and 1995 to 2001, but relinquished leadership to the United Kingdom for
the period 1989 to 1995. Diﬀerences among input growth rates are smaller
than diﬀerences among output growth rates, but there was a slowdown in
input growth during 1989 to 1995 throughout the G7. After 1995 growth
of input per capita increased in every G7 nation except Japan.
11.2.2 Comparisons of Capital and Labor Quality
A constant quality index of capital input weights capital inputs by prop-
erty compensation per unit of capital. By contrast, an index of capital
stock weights diﬀerent types of capital by asset prices. The ratio of capital
input to capital stock measures the average quality of a unit of capital. This
represents the diﬀerence between the constant quality index of capital in-
put introduced by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) and the index of capital
stock employed, for example, by Kuznets (1971) and Robert Solow (1970).
In table 11.5, I present capital input per capita for the G7 countries over
the period 1980 to 2001 relative to the United States in 2000. The United
States was the leader in capital input per capita throughout the period,
while Japan was the laggard. Canada led the remaining six countries in
1980, but was overtaken by Germany and Italy in 1995. Italy led the rest of
the G7 through 2001, but lagged considerably behind the United States.
The picture for capital stock per capita has some similarities to capital
input, but there are important diﬀerences. Capital stock levels do not ac-
curately reﬂect the substitutions among capital inputs that accompany in-
vestments in tangible assets, especially investments in IT equipment and
software. Japan led the G7 in capital stock per capita throughout the pe-
riod 1980 to 2001. The United Kingdom lagged the remaining countries of
the G7 throughout the period.
The behavior of capital quality highlights the diﬀerences between the
constant quality index of capital input and capital stock. There are impor-
tant changes in capital quality over time and persistent diﬀerences among
countries so that heterogeneity in capital input must be taken into account
in international comparisons of economic performance. Canada was the
332 Dale W. Jorgensoninternational leader in capital quality in 1980 and 2001, relinquishing the
lead to the United Kingdom in 1995, while Japan ranked at the bottom of
the G7 throughout the period.
I summarize growth in capital input and capital stock per capita as well
as capital quality for the G7 nations in table 11.6. Italy was the interna-
tional leader in capital input growth from 1980 to 1989, while the Canada
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Table 11.5 Levels of capital input and capital stock per capita and capital quality
United United 
Year States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Capital input per capita
1980 57.7 56.0 25.8 36.3 44.6 35.6 32.8
1989 73.7 67.1 37.9 48.3 62.1 62.4 43.5
1995 81.6 68.3 50.0 52.7 72.3 73.1 50.7
2001 103.9 78.0 56.1 58.1 83.5 89.4 58.3
Capital stock per capita
1980 76.8 40.7 24.1 36.2 60.2 36.0 93.1
1989 88.4 48.5 31.2 42.4 67.9 52.4 104.1
1995 92.2 50.8 35.9 47.0 77.0 62.3 114.8
2001 101.7 55.1 44.5 52.0 85.5 72.3 122.2
Capital quality
1980 75.1 137.5 107.0 100.1 74.0 98.8 35.2
1989 83.4 138.2 121.7 114.0 91.5 119.1 41.8
1995 88.5 134.6 139.3 112.2 94.0 117.4 44.2
2001 102.2 141.5 126.1 111.9 97.7 123.6 47.7
Notes: U.S.   100.0 in 2000. Canada data begins in 1981.
Table 11.6 Growth in capital input and capital stock per capita and capital
quality (%)
United United 
Year States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Capital input per capita
1980–1989 2.72 2.26 4.28 3.19 3.70 6.25 3.16
1989–1995 1.70 0.31 4.61 1.46 2.53 2.63 2.55
1995–2001 4.03 2.20 1.92 1.63 2.40 3.35 2.31
Capital stock per capita
1980–1989 1.56 2.19 2.85 1.74 1.34 4.18 1.25
1989–1995 0.70 1.05 2.36 1.74 2.09 2.87 1.63
1995–2001 1.63 1.36 3.57 1.67 1.75 2.49 1.04
Capital quality
1980–1989 1.17 0.07 1.43 1.45 2.36 2.07 1.91
1989–1995 0.99 –0.74 2.25 –0.27 0.44 –0.24 0.92
1995–2001 2.40 0.84 –1.65 –0.04 0.65 0.86 1.26
Note: Canada data begins in 1981.was the laggard. The United Kingdom led from 1989 to 1995, while
Canada lagged considerably behind the rest of the G7. The United States
took the lead after 1995. There was a slowdown in capital input growth
throughout the G7 after 1989, except for the United Kingdom, and a re-
vival after 1995 in the United States, Canada, France, and Italy.
A constant quality index of labor input weights hours worked for diﬀer-
ent categories by labor compensation per hour. An index of hours worked
fails to take quality diﬀerences into account. The ratio of labor input to
hours worked measures the average quality of an hour of labor, as reﬂected
in its marginal product. This represents the diﬀerence between the con-
stant quality index of labor input used by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967)
and the index of hours worked employed, for example, by Kuznets (1971)
and Solow (1970).
In table 11.7, I present labor input per capita for the G7 nations for the
period 1980 to 2001 relative to the United States in 2000. Japan was the in-
ternational leader throughout the period 1980 to 2001. Labor input in
Japan was nearly double that in Italy. The United States led the remaining
G7 nations. The United Kingdom ranked third among the G7 through
1995, but fell slightly behind Canada in 2001. Italy and France lagged be-
hind the rest of the G7 for the entire period.
The picture for hours worked per capita has some similarities to labor in-
put, but there are important diﬀerences. Japan was the international leader
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Table 11.7 Levels of labor input and hours worked per capita and labor quality
United United 
Year States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Labor input per capita
1980 81.1 73.0 78.9 63.0 75.4 48.8 94.8
1989 91.9 82.1 85.4 59.4 78.7 51.0 107.5
1995 94.2 82.3 82.4 61.7 75.2 50.6 105.5
2001 98.8 89.3 89.2 65.3 75.9 55.1 100.9
Hours worked per capita
1980 89.7 91.4 92.0 79.3 82.3 71.4 111.9
1989 97.1 96.6 97.7 71.2 82.7 72.1 115.6
1995 95.9 90.9 89.8 67.6 76.4 68.9 109.9
2001 98.3 96.3 94.2 69.7 75.3 72.3 101.1
Labor quality
1980 90.4 79.9 85.7 79.5 91.6 68.3 84.7
1989 94.7 85.0 87.4 83.5 95.2 70.7 93.0
1995 98.2 90.6 91.7 91.2 98.4 73.5 96.0
2001 100.5 92.7 94.7 93.7 100.9 76.1 99.9
Notes: U.S.   100.0 in 2000. Canada data begins in 1981.in hours worked per capita. The United States, Canada, and the United
Kingdom moved roughly in parallel. The United Kingdom ranked second
in 1980 and 1989, while the United States ranked second in 1995 and 2001.
France and Italy lagged the rest of the G7 from 1980 to 2001.
The behavior of labor quality highlights the diﬀerences between labor
input and hours worked. Germany was the leader in labor quality
throughout the period 1980 to 2001. The United States ranked second in
labor quality, but Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan ap-
proached U.S. levels in 2001. Labor quality levels in these four countries
moved in parallel throughout the period. Italy was the laggard among the
G7 in labor quality as well as hours worked.
I summarize growth in labor input and hours worked per capita as well
as labor quality for the period 1980 to 2001 in table 11.8. Canada and Japan
led the G7 nations in labor input growth during the 1980s, France led from
1989 to 1995 but relinquished its leadership to Italy after 1995. Labor in-
put growth was negative for France during the 1980s, for the United King-
dom, Germany, Italy, and Japan during the period 1989 to 1995, and for
Japan after 1995.
Hours worked per capita fell continuously through the 1989 to 2001 pe-
riod for Japan and declined for all the G7 nations during the period 1989
to 1995. Growth in labor quality was positive for the G7 nations in all time
periods. Japan was the leader during the 1980s, relinquishing its lead to
France during the early 1990s, but regaining its lead in the 1995 to 2001 pe-
riod. Growth in labor quality and hours worked are equally important as
sources of growth in labor input for the G7.
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Table 11.8 Growth in labor input and hours worked per capita and labor quality (%)
United United 
Year States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Labor input per capita
1980–1989 1.38 1.47 0.88 –0.65 0.48 0.49 1.40
1989–1995 0.41 0.04 –0.59 0.61 –0.78 –0.13 –0.32
1995–2001 0.79 1.35 1.32 0.95 0.17 1.40 –0.73
Hours worked per capita
1980–1989 0.87 0.69 0.67 –1.20 0.06 0.10 0.36
1989–1995 –0.21 –1.02 –1.41 –0.86 –1.33 –0.75 –0.84
1995–2001 0.41 0.98 0.79 0.50 –0.25 0.81 –1.39
Labor quality
1980–1989 0.51 0.78 0.21 0.55 0.42 0.39 1.04
1989–1995 0.61 1.06 0.81 1.47 0.55 0.63 0.52
1995–2001 0.38 0.38 0.53 0.45 0.41 0.60 0.66
Note: Canada data begins in 1981.11.3 Investment in IT
Using data from tables 11.1 and 11.2, I can assess the relative importance
of investment and productivity as sources of economic growth for the G7
nations. Investments in tangible assets and human capital greatly predom-
inated over productivity during the period 1980 to 2001. While productiv-
ity fell in Italy during this period, the remaining G7 countries had positive
productivity growth.
Similarly, using data from table 11.5, I can assess the relative importance
of growth in capital stock and capital quality. Capital input growth was
positive for all countries for the period 1980 to 2001 and all three subperi-
ods. Capital quality growth was positive for the period as a whole for all G7
countries. Although capital stock predominated in capital input growth,
capital quality was also quantitatively signiﬁcant, especially after 1995.
Finally, using data from table 11.7, I can assess the relative importance
of growth in hours worked and labor quality. Hours worked per capita de-
clined for France, Germany, and Japan, while labor quality rose in these
nations during the period 1980 to 2001. For the United States, Canada, the
United Kingdom, and Italy, both hours worked per capita and labor qual-
ity rose. I conclude that labor quality growth is essential to the analysis of
growth in labor input.
11.3.1 Investment in IT Equipment and Software
The ﬁnal step in the comparison of patterns of economic growth among
the G7 nations is to analyze the impact of investment in IT equipment and
software. In table 11.9, I present levels of IT capital input per capita for the
G7 for the period 1980 to 2001, relative to the United States in 2000. The
United States overtook Germany in 1989 and remained the leader through
2001. Canada lagged behind the rest of the G7 through 1995, but France
fell into last place in 2001.
Table 11.9 reveals substantial diﬀerences between IT capital stock and
IT capital input. The G7 nations began with very modest stocks of IT
equipment and software per capita in 1980. These stocks expanded rapidly
during the period 1980 to 2001. The United States led in IT capital stock
throughout the period, while Japan moved from the fourth highest level in
1980 to the third highest in 2001.
IT capital quality reﬂects diﬀerences in the composition of IT capital in-
put, relative to IT capital stock. A rising level of capital quality indicates a
shift toward short-lived assets, such as computers and software. This shift
is particularly dramatic for the United States, Canada, and Japan, while
the composition of IT capital stock changed relatively less for the United
Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy. Patterns for non-IT capital input,
capital stock, and capital quality largely reﬂect those for capital as a whole,
presented in table 11.10.
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capital quality
United United 
Year States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
IT capital input per capita
1980 4.5 1.0 3.0 4.2 7.1 6.7 1.7
1989 19.3 3.9 10.9 11.9 18.7 18.8 10.3
1995 38.1 11.2 20.9 19.1 31.1 31.2 19.0
2001 115.3 45.6 53.6 38.1 59.7 60.3 46.0
IT capital stock per capita
1980 9.8 0.8 2.5 3.5 6.1 4.6 3.5
1989 27.4 3.7 9.6 9.9 15.5 13.1 12.7
1995 46.8 9.7 19.2 18.0 28.2 23.8 22.9
2001 110.7 31.8 44.9 33.4 49.7 44.1 47.8
IT capital quality
1980 46.4 118.4 118.5 117.5 117.4 146.8 47.8
1989 70.4 107.4 112.7 119.7 120.4 143.2 81.1
1995 81.3 115.0 108.9 106.2 110.1 131.0 83.0
2001 104.1 143.4 119.3 114.1 120.2 136.6 96.1
Notes: U.S.   100.0 in 2000. Canada data begins in 1981.
Table 11.10 Levels of non-IT capital input and capital stock per capita and non-IT
capital quality
United United 
Year States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Non-IT capital input per capita
1980 73.8 73.1 30.7 41.3 51.9 41.6 39.3
1989 87.0 83.1 43.4 53.9 70.3 71.3 47.9
1995 90.7 79.9 55.9 57.9 79.7 81.2 53.9
2001 102.2 84.0 56.4 62.6 87.3 94.7 57.1
Non-IT capital stock per capita
1980 82.5 44.1 25.7 38.0 63.4 38.2 99.1
1989 92.5 51.5 32.6 44.0 70.6 54.8 110.0
1995 94.8 53.0 36.9 48.3 79.3 64.4 120.6
2001 101.4 57.4 44.5 54.1 87.2 75.1 127.1
Non-IT capital quality
1980 89.5 165.7 119.2 108.5 81.9 109.2 39.6
1989 94.1 161.2 133.2 122.6 99.5 130.0 43.6
1995 95.6 150.7 151.5 119.9 100.5 126.0 44.7
2001 100.8 146.5 126.7 115.8 100.1 126.1 44.9
Notes: U.S.   100.0 in 2000. Canada data begins in 1981.I give growth rates for IT capital input per capita, capital stock per
capita, and capital quality in table 11.11. The G7 nations have exhibited
double-digit growth in IT capital input per capita since 1995. Canada was
the international leader during this period, with the United States close be-
hind. Japan was the leader in growth of IT capital input during the 1980s,
another period of double-digit growth in the G7. However, Japanese IT
growth slowed markedly during 1989 to 1995, and Canada gained the lead.
Patterns of growth for IT capital stock per capita are similar to those for
IT capital input for the four European countries. Changes in the composi-
tion of IT capital stock per capita were important sources of growth of IT
capital input per capita for the United States, Canada, and Japan. Infor-
mation technology capital stock also followed the pattern of IT capital in-
put with substantial growth during the 1980s, followed by a pronounced
lull during the period 1989 to 1995. After 1995, the growth rates of IT cap-
ital stock surged in all the G7 countries, but exceeded the rates of the 1980s
only for the United States and Canada. Finally, growth rates for IT capital
quality reﬂect the rates at which shorter-lived IT assets are substituted for
longer-lived assets.
Japan led in the growth of capital quality during the 1980s, but relin-
quished its lead to the United States in 1989. Information technology cap-
ital quality growth for the United States, Canada, and Japan outstripped
that for the four European countries for most of the period 1980 to 2001.
Patterns of growth in non-IT capital input per capita, non-IT capital stock
per capita, and non-IT capital quality given in table 11.12 largely reﬂect
those for capital as a whole presented in table 11.6.
Table 11.13 and ﬁgure 11.1 present the contribution of capital input to
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Table 11.11 Growth in IT capital input and capital stock per capita and IT capital
quality (%)
United United 
Year States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
IT capital input per capita
1980–1989 16.09 17.66 14.43 11.66 10.71 11.44 20.19
1989–1995 11.35 17.42 10.91 7.92 8.47 8.44 10.22
1995–2001 18.47 23.42 15.69 11.55 10.87 10.98 14.71
IT capital stock per capita
1980–1989 11.47 18.88 14.98 11.46 10.43 11.72 14.32
1989–1995 8.94 16.28 11.50 9.91 9.97 9.94 9.84
1995–2001 14.34 19.73 14.16 10.35 9.40 10.28 12.25
IT capital quality
1980–1989 4.63 –1.22 –0.56 0.20 0.28 –0.27 5.88
1989–1995 2.41 1.14 –0.58 –1.99 –1.50 –1.49 0.38
1995–2001 4.12 3.69 1.53 1.20 1.47 0.70 2.46
Note: Canada data begins in 1981.economic growth for the G7 nations, divided between IT and non-IT. The
powerful surge of IT investment in the United States after 1995 is mirrored
in similar jumps in growth rates of the contribution of IT capital through
the G7. The contribution of IT capital input was similar during the 1980s
and the period 1989 to 1995 for all the G7 nations, despite the dip in rates
of economic growth after 1989. Japan is an exception to this general pat-
tern with a contribution of IT capital comparable to that of the United
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Table 11.12 Growth in non-IT capital input and capital stock per capita and non-IT
capital quality (%)
United United 
Year States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Non-IT capital input per capita
1980–1989 1.83 1.60 3.85 2.97 3.36 5.97 2.21
1989–1995 0.68 –0.66 4.22 1.20 2.09 2.17 1.95
1995–2001 2.00 0.85 0.15 1.30 1.52 2.57 0.96
Non-IT capital stock per capita
1980–1989 1.27 1.94 2.62 1.61 1.20 4.03 1.16
1989–1995 0.41 0.47 2.07 1.58 1.92 2.68 1.53
1995–2001 1.11 1.32 3.12 1.87 1.59 2.56 0.88
Non-IT capital quality
1980–1989 0.56 –0.35 1.23 1.36 2.16 1.94 1.05
1989–1995 0.27 –1.13 2.15 –0.38 0.17 –0.51 0.42
1995–2001 0.88 –0.47 –2.97 –0.57 –0.06 0.01 0.08
Note: Canada data begins in 1981.
Table 11.13 Contribution of total capital, IT capital and non-IT capital to output
growth (%)
United United 
Year States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Total capital
1980–1989 1.53 1.71 1.80 2.12 1.44 2.55 1.49
1989–1995 1.19 0.76 1.96 1.12 1.31 1.12 1.19
1995–2001 2.10 1.67 0.94 1.15 1.11 1.47 1.01
IT capital
1980–1989 0.45 0.39 0.24 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.44
1989–1995 0.49 0.49 0.27 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.32
1995–2001 0.99 0.86 0.76 0.42 0.46 0.49 0.58
Non-IT capital
1980–1989 1.08 1.32 1.56 1.94 1.25 2.31 1.05
1989–1995 0.70 0.27 1.69 0.93 1.05 0.86 0.87
1995–2001 1.11 0.81 0.18 0.73 0.65 0.98 0.43
Notes: Contribution is growth rate times value share. Canada data begins in 1981.States during the 1980s, followed by a decline in this contribution from
1989 to 1995, reﬂecting the sharp downturn in Japanese economic growth.
The contribution of non-IT capital input to economic growth after 1995
exceeded that for IT capital input for four of the G7 nations; the exceptions
were Canada, the United Kingdom, and Japan. The United States stands
out in the magnitude of the contribution of capital input after 1995. Both
IT and non-IT capital input contributed to the U.S. economic resurgence
of the last half of the 1990s. Despite the strong performance of IT invest-
ment in Japan after 1995, the contribution of capital input declined sub-
stantially; the pattern for the United Kingdom is similar.
11.3.2 The Relative Importance of Investment and Productivity
Table 11.14 and ﬁgure 11.2 present contributions to economic growth
from productivity, divided between the IT-producing and non-IT-
producing industries. The methodology for this division follows Triplett
(1996). The contribution of IT-producing industries was positive through-
out the period 1980 to 2001 and jumped substantially after 1995. Because
the level of productivity in Italy was higher in 1980 than in 2001, it is not
surprising that the contribution of productivity growth in the non-IT in-
dustries was negative throughout the period. Productivity in these indus-
tries declined during the period 1989 to 1995 in Canada and Germany as
well as Italy. The decline aﬀected Canada, the United Kingdom, France,
and Italy from 1989 to 1995 and became very steep in Germany and Italy
from 1995 to 2001.
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Fig. 11.1 Capital input contribution by countryTable 11.15 and ﬁgure 11.3 give a comprehensive view of the sources of
economic growth for the G7. The contribution of capital input alone exceeds
that of productivity for most nations and most time periods. The contribu-
tion of non-IT capital input predominates over IT capital input for most
countries and most time periods with Canada in 1989 to 1995 and the United
Kingdom and Japan after 1995 as exceptions. This can be attributed to the
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Table 11.14 Contributions of productivity from IT and non-IT production to output
growth (%)
United United 
Year States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Productivity
1980–1989 0.52 0.06 0.34 0.32 0.23 –0.36 1.15
1989–1995 0.26 0.00 –0.11 –0.26 1.12 0.37 1.04
1995–2001 0.54 0.58 0.91 0.60 –0.10 –0.49 0.75
Productivity from IT production
1980–1989 0.23 0.14 0.23 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.15
1989–1995 0.23 0.14 0.32 0.29 0.43 0.38 0.20
1995–2001 0.48 0.17 0.82 0.56 0.65 0.68 0.46
Productivity from non-IT production
1980–1989 0.29 –0.08 0.11 0.03 –0.05 –0.68 1.00
1989–1995 0.03 –0.14 –0.43 –0.55 0.69 –0.01 0.84
1995–2001 0.06 0.41 0.09 0.04 –0.75 –1.17 0.29
Note: Canada data begins in 1981.
Fig. 11.2 Sources of total factor productivity growth by countryTable 11.15 Sources of output growth (%)
United United 
Year States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Output
1980–1989 3.38 3.10 2.69 2.38 1.99 2.51 3.83
1989–1995 2.43 1.39 1.62 1.30 2.34 1.52 2.23
1995–2001 3.76 3.34 2.74 2.34 1.18 1.90 1.45
Labor
1980–1989 1.33 1.33 0.56 –0.06 0.32 0.32 1.20
1989–1995 0.98 0.62 –0.24 0.44 –0.09 0.03 0.00
1995–2001 1.12 1.08 0.88 0.59 0.17 0.93 –0.31
IT capital
1980–1989 0.45 0.39 0.24 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.44
1989–1995 0.49 0.49 0.27 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.32
1995–2001 0.99 0.86 0.76 0.42 0.46 0.49 0.58
Non-IT capital
1980–1989 1.08 1.32 1.56 1.94 1.25 2.31 1.05
1989–1995 0.70 0.27 1.69 0.93 1.05 0.86 0.87
1995–2001 1.11 0.81 0.18 0.73 0.65 0.98 0.43
Productivity from IT production
1980–1989 0.23 0.14 0.23 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.15
1989–1995 0.23 0.14 0.32 0.29 0.43 0.38 0.20
1995–2001 0.48 0.17 0.82 0.56 0.65 0.68 0.46
Productivity from non-IT production
1980–1989 0.29 –0.08 0.11 0.03 –0.05 –0.68 1.00
1989–1995 0.03 –0.14 –0.43 –0.55 0.69 –0.01 0.84
1995–2001 0.06 0.41 0.09 0.04 –0.75 –1.17 0.29
Note: Contributions; Canada data begins in 1981.
Fig. 11.3 Sources of economic growth by countryunusual weakness in the growth of aggregate demand in these countries. The
contribution of labor input varies considerably among the G7 nations with
negative contributions after 1995 in Japan, during the 1980s in France, and
during the period 1989 to 1995 in the United Kingdom and Germany.
Finally, table 11.16 and ﬁgure 11.4 translate sources of growth into
sources of growth in average labor productivity (ALP). Average labor pro-
ductivity, deﬁned as output per hour worked, must be carefully distin-
guished from overall productivity, deﬁned as output per unit of both capi-
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Table 11.16 Sources of labor productivity growth (%)
United United 
Year States Canada Kingdom France Germany Italy Japan
Output
1980–1989 3.38 3.10 2.69 2.38 1.99 2.51 3.83
1989–1995 2.43 1.39 1.62 1.30 2.34 1.52 2.23
1995–2001 3.76 3.34 2.74 2.34 1.18 1.90 1.45
Hours
1980–1989 1.79 1.87 0.82 –0.66 0.11 0.15 0.95
1989–1995 1.02 0.20 –1.17 –0.41 –0.71 –0.57 –0.51
1995–2001 1.53 1.93 1.03 0.91 –0.11 0.99 –1.14
Labor productivity
1980–1989 1.58 1.23 1.87 3.04 1.88 2.36 2.89
1989–1995 1.40 1.19 2.79 1.71 3.05 2.09 2.74
1995–2001 2.23 1.41 1.71 1.43 1.29 0.92 2.59
IT capital deepening
1980–1989 0.40 0.35 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.42
1989–1995 0.44 0.48 0.29 0.20 0.28 0.28 0.33
1995–2001 0.92 0.79 0.71 0.39 0.46 0.45 0.63
Non-IT capital deepening
1980–1989 0.37 0.42 1.20 2.29 1.20 2.25 0.69
1989–1995 0.34 0.16 2.11 1.15 1.33 1.06 1.06
1995–2001 0.55 –0.14 –0.21 0.25 0.70 0.61 0.83
Labor quality
1980–1989 0.30 0.40 0.12 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.63
1989–1995 0.36 0.55 0.49 0.61 0.33 0.38 0.31
1995–2001 0.23 0.18 0.30 0.19 0.23 0.35 0.38
Productivity from IT production
1980–1989 0.23 0.14 0.23 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.15
1989–1995 0.23 0.14 0.32 0.29 0.43 0.38 0.20
1995–2001 0.48 0.17 0.82 0.56 0.65 0.68 0.46
Productivity from non-IT production
1980–1989 0.29 –0.08 0.11 0.03 –0.05 –0.68 1.00
1989–1995 0.03 –0.14 –0.43 –0.55 0.69 –0.01 0.84
1995–2001 0.06 0.41 0.09 0.04 –0.75 –1.17 0.29
Note: Contributions; Canada data begins in 1981.tal and labor inputs. Output growth is the sum of growth in hours worked
and growth in ALP. Average labor productivity growth depends on the
contribution of capital deepening, the contribution of growth in labor
quality, and productivity growth.
Capital deepening is the contribution of growth in capital input per hour
worked and predominates over productivity as a source of ALP growth for
the G7 nations. Information technology capital deepening predominates
over non-IT capital deepening in the United States throughout the period
1980–2001 and in Canada after 1989, the United Kingdom and France af-
ter 1995. Finally, the contribution of labor quality is positive for all the G7
nations through the period.
11.4 Alternative Approaches
Edward Denison’s (1967) pathbreaking volume, Why Growth Rates Dif-
fer, compared diﬀerences in growth rates for national income net of capital
consumption per capita for the period 1950 to 1962 with diﬀerences of lev-
els in 1960 for eight European countries and the United States. The Euro-
pean countries were characterized by much more rapid growth and a lower
level of national income per capita. However, this association did not hold
for all comparisons between the individual countries and the United States.
Nonetheless, Denison concluded:13
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Fig. 11.4 Sources of labor productivity growth by country
13. See Denison (1967), especially chapter 21, “The Sources of Growth and the Contrast
between Europe and the United States,” pages 296–348.Aside from short-term aberrations Europe should be able to report
higher growth rates, at least in national income per person employed, for
a long time. Americans should expect this and not be disturbed by it.
(1967, 344)
Maddison (1987, 1991) constructed estimates of aggregate output, input,
and productivity growth for France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom for the period 1870 to 1987. Maddison (1995) ex-
tended estimates for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan
backward to 1820 and forward to 1992. He deﬁned output as gross of capi-
tal consumption throughout the period and constructed constant quality
indexes of labor input for the period 1913 to 1984, but not for 1870 to 1913.
Maddison employed capital stock as a measure of the input of capital,
ignoring the changes in the composition of capital stock that are such an
important source of growth for the G7 nations. This omission is especially
critical in assessing the impact of investment in information technology.
Finally, he reduced the growth rate of the price index for investment by 1
percent per year for all countries and all time periods to correct for biases
like those identiﬁed by Wyckoﬀ (1995).
11.4.1 Comparisons without Growth Accounts
Kuznets (1971) provided elaborate comparisons of growth rates for four-
teen industrialized countries. Unlike Denison (1967), he did not provide
level comparisons. Maddison (1982) ﬁlled this lacuna by comparing levels
of national product for sixteen countries. These comparisons used esti-
mates of purchasing power parities by Irving Kravis, Alan Heston, and
Robert Summers (1978).14
Maddison (1995) extended his long-term estimates of the growth of na-
tional product and population to ﬁfty-six countries, covering the period
1820 to 1992. Maddison (2001) updated these estimates to 1998 in his mag-
isterial volume, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective.He provided
estimates for 134 countries, as well as seven regions of the world—Western
Europe, Western Oﬀshoots (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
United States), Eastern Europe, Former U.S.S.R., Latin America, Asia,
and Africa.
Purchasing power parities have been updated by successive versions of
the Penn World Table. A complete list of these tables through Mark 5 is
given by Summers and Heston (1991). The current version of the Penn
World Table is available on the Center for International Comparisons Web
site at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP). This covers 168 countries
for the period 1950 to 2000 and represents one of the most signiﬁcant
achievements in economic measurement of the postwar period.15
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14. For details, see Maddison (1982, 159–68).
15. See Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002). The CICUP Web site is at http://www.pwt.econ
.upenn.edu/aboutpwt.html.11.4.2 Convergence
Data presented by Kuznets (1971), Maddison (2001) and successive ver-
sions of the Penn World Table have made it possible to reconsider the issue
of convergence raised by Denison (1967). Moses Abramovitz (1986) was
the ﬁrst to take up the challenge by analyzing convergence of output per
capita among Maddison’s sixteen countries. He found that convergence
characterized the postwar period, while there was no tendency toward con-
vergence before 1914 and during the interwar period. Baumol (1986) for-
malized these results by running a regression of growth rate of GDP per
capita over the period 1870 to 1979 on the 1870 level of GDP per capita.16
In a highly innovative paper on “Crazy Explanations for the Productiv-
ity Slowdown,” Paul Romer (1987) derived Baumol’s “growth regression”
from Solow’s (1970) growth model with a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion. Romer’s empirical contribution was to extend the growth regressions
from Maddison’s (1982) sixteen advanced countries to the 115 countries in
the Penn World Table (Mark 3). Romer’s key ﬁnding was an estimate of the
elasticity of output with respect to capital close to three-quarters. The
share of capital in GNP implied by Solow’s model was less than half as
great.
Gregory Mankiw, David Romer, and David Weil (1992) defended the
traditional framework of Kuznets (1971) and Solow (1970). The empirical
part of their study is based on data for ninety-eight countries from the Penn
World Table (Mark 4). Like Paul Romer (1987), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil
derived a growth regression from the Solow (1970) model; however, they
augmented this by allowing for investment in human capital.
The results of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) provided empirical sup-
port for the augmented Solow model. There was clear evidence of the con-
vergence predicted by the model; in addition, the estimated elasticity of
output with respect to capital was in line with the share of capital in the
value of output. The rate of convergence of output per capita was too slow
to be consistent with 1970 version of the Solow model, but supported the
augmented version.
11.4.3 Modeling Productivity Diﬀerences
Finally, Islam (1995) exploited an important feature of the Penn World
Table overlooked in prior studies. This panel data set contains benchmark
comparisons of levels of the national product at ﬁve-year intervals, begin-
ning in 1960. This made it possible to test an assumption maintained in
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16. Baumol’s (1986) “growth regression” has spawned a vast literature, recently summa-
rized by Steven Durlauf and Danny Quah (1999; Ellen McGrattan and James Schmitz (1999);
and Islam (2003). Much of this literature is based on data from successive versions of the Penn
World Table.growth regressions. These regressions had assumed identical levels of pro-
ductivity for all countries included in the Penn World Table.
Substantial diﬀerences in levels of productivity among countries have
been documented by Denison (1967), by my papers with Christensen and
Cummings (Christensen, Cummings, and Jorgenson 1981), Dougherty
(Dougherty and Jorgenson 1996, 1999), and Yip (Jorgenson and Yip 2000)
and in section 11.2. By introducing econometric methods for panel data,
Islam (1995) was able to allow for these diﬀerences. He corroborated the
ﬁnding of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) that the elasticity of output
with respect to capital input coincided with the share of capital in the value
of output.
In addition, Islam (1995) found that the rate of convergence of output
per capita among countries in the Penn World Table substantiated the
unaugmentedversion of the Solow (1970) growth model. In short, “crazy ex-
planations” for the productivity slowdown, like those propounded by Paul
Romer (1987, 1994), were unnecessary. Moreover, the model did not require
augmentation by endogenous investment in human capital, as proposed
by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992).
Islam concluded that diﬀerences in technology among countries must be
included in econometric models of growth rates. This requires economet-
ric techniques for panel data, like those originated by Gary Chamberlain
(1984), rather than the regression methods of Baumol (1986), Paul Romer
(1987), and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992). Panel data techniques have
now superseded regression methods in modeling diﬀerences in output per
capita.
11.5 Conclusions
I conclude that a powerful surge in investment in IT and equipment af-
ter 1995 characterizes all of the G7 economies. This accounts for a large
portion of the resurgence in U.S. economic growth, but contributes sub-
stantially to economic growth in the remaining G7 economies as well. An-
other signiﬁcant source of the G7 growth resurgence after 1995 is a jump
in productivity growth in IT-producing industries.
For Japan, the dramatic upward leap in the impact of IT investment af-
ter 1995 was insuﬃcient to overcome downward pressures from deﬁcient
growth of aggregate demand. This manifests itself in declining contribu-
tions of non-IT capital and labor inputs. Similar downturns are visible in
non-IT capital input in France, Germany, and especially the United King-
dom after 1995.
These ﬁndings are based on new data and new methodology for analyz-
ing the sources of economic growth. Internationally harmonized prices for
information technology equipment and software are essential for captur-
ing diﬀerences among the G7 nations. Constant quality indexes of capital
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IT and human capital.
Exploiting the new data and methodology, I have been able to show that
investment in tangible assets is the most important source of economic
growth in the G7 nations. The contribution of capital input exceeds that of
productivity for all countries for all periods. The relative importance of
productivity growth is far less than suggested by the traditional methodol-
ogy of Kuznets (1971) and Solow (1970), which is now obsolete.
The conclusion from Islam’s (1995) research is that the Solow (1970)
model is appropriate for modeling the endogenous accumulation of tangi-
ble assets. It is unnecessary to endogenize human capital accumulation as
well. The transition path to balanced growth equilibrium after a change in
policies that aﬀects investment in tangible assets requires decades, while
the transition after a change aﬀecting investment in human capital requires
as much as a century.
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